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The EU’s proposed defence reforms are not going to make a difference to Ukraine in the short term, warns Camille Grand, NATO’s former assistant secretary general for defence investment. Both the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) “are going to be very useful in the longer term, provided that the money comes in 2028, which is more or less the cycle that the EU is announcing”, Grand tells Talking Europe. He talks about Ukraine’s ammunition shortage – a subject on which he put forward a 10-point plan at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he is distinguished policy fellow. We also discuss how NATO has evolved since the start of the war, and the ways in which, according to Grand, NATO and the EU can – and should – work together more closely.
On EDIS and EDIP, “there is neither the money nor the support of the Member States and industry to allow those initiatives to make a difference today to Ukrainians, or to rebuild our own stockpiles,” Grand says.
“According to the EU treaties, defence remains a competency for the member states,” he goes on. “As the Commission affirms its intention to become an important player in this domain and hopefully with significant money on the table, there will be a tension with the member states who will want to see what’s the added value of the Commission, and how is that going to fit with their own priorities and requirements.”
Grand also addresses the recent announcement by France‘s minister of the armed forces, who said that the French government might force firms to put defence orders before civilian ones if manufacturing does not speed up. “This is really about critical components and subcomponents. If you think of ammunition production or missile production, there are some components which might be microelectronics or very basic things like black powder, that need to be prioritised for defence needs,” Grand explains. The French authorities are making “a fair request”, Grand says. “You can’t say, on the one hand, ‘we’re in a war economy’, and on the other hand say, ‘oh, it’s a pity that some of the ammunition production is not available because we are competing with civilian needs’.”
On the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House and Europeans “Trump-proofing” their security, Grand says: “We have to prepare for a whole range of scenarios. And we have to be serious about defence over a decade. So that is being able to act with possibly less American commitment, but also, simply, to face a degraded security environment no matter who is in the White House. I think this is within reach. The Europeans have already increased their defence expenditure quite significantly. We had only three allies at 2 percent [of GDP spending on defence] in 2014 at NATO. Now we have close to 20 this year. European allies have turned the corner on this. But it now needs to be sustained.”
Grand argues that there is still a lot of room for NATO and the EU to cooperate more closely. “There is institutional competition, which is absolutely not useful in today’s environment. Both organisations need to turn to each other and see what they can bring to the table and how they can support each other. It’s a good thing that the EU is more active, but the EU needs to work more closely with NATO. Both the EU and NATO need to be much more relaxed about how they work together.”
Programme prepared by Sophie Samaille, Perrine Desplats and Paul Guianvarc’h
